14.16 Strategy and Information


Class Info

Begins with a rigorous overview of the main equilbrium concepts for non-cooperative games in normal and extensive form, with complete or incomplete information. Defines and explores properties of iterated dominance, rationalizability, Nash equilibrium, subgame perfection, perfect Bayesian equilibrium, and sequential, perfect and proper equilibria. Introduces solution concepts for cooperative games and studies non-cooperative implementations. Other topics include matching and allocation problems, auctions and mechanism design, and reputation. Bargaining and networks are recurring themes.

This class has 14.12 as a prerequisite.

14.16 will not be offered this semester. It will be available in the Spring semester, and will be instructed by M. Manea.

Lecture occurs 2:30 PM to 4:00 PM on Mondays and Wednesdays in E51-361.

This class counts for a total of 12 credits. This class counts as a HASS S.

In the Spring 2016 Subject Evaluations, 14.16 was rated 5.3 out of 7.0. You can find more information at the MIT Economics : Mihai Manea site or on the 14.16 Stellar site.

MIT 14.16 Strategy and Information Related Textbooks
MIT 14.16 Strategy and Information On The Web
MIT Economics : Mihai Manea
Tags
theory e52-300 graduate microeconomic sophie chang massachusetts institute of technology • department of economics the morris

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